Tibetans in PLA
1. Historically Tibetans had been brave warriors. But owing to their military and tactical weaknesses, despite maintaining their own independent army, they were defeated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) during the course of Tibetan uprising.
2. The defeated Tibetan army was not made part of the regular armed force of the PRC ie., the PLA, but was inducted into the other two armed forces viz, Militia and the People's Armed Police Force (PAPF), especially the Militia units. In times of national emergency, they act as a reserve and support element for the PLA Ground Forces (PLAGF). Due to their genetic superiority and specialisation in operating at high altitudes, they play a major role in logistics and transportation, using mules and horses.
3. Today Tibetans form a meager part of the entire strength of the Chinese armed forces. There are few Tibetan officers in the PLA who rose to their positions because of loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), also their parents or family members were/are part of the CCP. The Tibetan PLA soldiers have to prove that they do not have links with the Dalai Lama or his followers or any such overseas organisations, and are vociferously pro-China.
4. Tibetans have to face certain challenges as most of them belong to pastoral background. Compared to their Han colleagues, Tibetan officers and soldiers are required to possess excellent personal qualities. They are needed to be politically firm, disciplined and are required to work harder. Also, there was and still is a trust deficit between the CCP and the Tibetans, owing to the latter’s allegiance to the Dalai Lama. Tibet Military District (TMD), a military district of the PLAGF, despite having many senior Tibetan officers of the rank of colonels, senior colonels and major generals, has always been headed by Han Commanders is a proof of distrust.
5. Despite these challenges, Tibetans get the opportunity of employment through recruitment in the PLA. It may be noted that the pastoral land in Tibet is slowly being wiped out by the CCP in the name of Tibet’s development.
6. Since the Sino-India standoff in Ladakh, China renewed its focus to train and induct more Tibetans into the PLA. It started a Special Recruitment Drive (SRD) for young Tibetans and even made it mandatory for every Tibetan household to send one person for this SRD. The recruited Tibetan youths are to form a new Special Tibetan Army Unit (STAU) and will not be part of the regular Militia. China reportedly even claimed that it has established five new-type of militia groups in the summer of last year. These groups are named the Snow Hawk Air Patrol Team, the Snow Pigeon Communication Team, the Snow Wolf Mountaineering Expedition, the Snow Fox Quick Response Team, and the Snow Mastiff Fighting Team. These new-type of militia units, with special skills, advanced technology and excellent equipment, are being raised in Lhasa region under the Tibet Military District (TMD).
7. It is worth noting that in this SRD, the Chinese authorities again ensured that no anti-Beijing Tibetan sneaks into the PLA. The Tibetans selected through the SRD were required to undergo loyalty tests as followed in the past, and it was ensured that either parents, of the selected recruits, were Hans.
8. Although, the response to China’s all-out efforts to recruit Tibetans for the PLA, has been tepid, some considerations are worth noting.
(a) In the event of a war with India, the newly recruited Tibetan youths might bring advantages for the Chinese army.
(b) They could be deployed as reinforcements for the regular Chinese army units when needed.
(c) The trained Tibetans might be used to assist the PLA in better control of Tibet and in turn might influence the Tibetans living in India.
(d) These soldiers, being locals and genetically superuir to Han soldiers, will be handy and easily deployable in high altitude and inhospitable terrains.
(e) They may act as early warning and delay Indian operations like our scouts.
(f) Some of the recruits are reportedly being trained by the PLA to be put on duty at border trade markets and the Xiaokang villages. This might also become a strategy of China to eventually use these villages as tools to strengthen its claims on border area, especially Arunachal Pradesh.
9. As far as India is concerned the implications of the new SRD of China poses no immediate challenge. Presently, Tibetan recruitment and their strength in PLA is very less and that too dispersed, except for some small group Militia units. However, it is important to monitor the activities of these new soldiers especially with regard to their employment and deployment in areas opposite Northern Borders.