Evolving Outlook of Countries in the South China Sea Dispute

The South China Sea (SCS) has witnessed intense activity with indications of changes in the outlook of countries towards the dispute, over the past year or so. An assessment of this activity and the evolving position of various stakeholders and the countries of the littoral, especially members of ASEAN, is provided below. Taiwan has however, not been included since its position mirrors that of China, though it has not taken any discernible actions in the recent past.

China. China seems to have adopted a conciliatory approach, possibly temporary, to the disputes of the SCS with its Foreign Minister stating that the SCS is a “shared home” for ASEAN and China. Coupled with the outreach to ASEAN during the ongoing pandemic, China appears to be keen on achieving some convergence, especially for the finalisation of the Code of Conduct (CoC), among the claimant countries. The reduction in the usual aggression of Chinese maritime activity over the past few months may have been prompted by American actions as also a desire to avoid adverse reactions from the ASEAN in the current situation. However, China’s position on its territorial claims continues to harden with the recent administrative actions of establishing separate districts and the re-naming of features in the region. Undertaking marine surveys in the EEZ of littoral nations is another way of not just asserting its claims, but also deterring prospective exploration. It is also not averse to displaying this aggressive approach as witnessed in some maritime altercations with Vietnam and the Philippines. While there seems to be a reduction in China’s maritime aggression, Chinese military activity is clearly on the rise in the SCS and adjoining seas. Regular large scale naval exercises in the SCS as also joint exercises, between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, Air Force and Ground Forces, have been undertaken in the region. These exercises have involved not just naval activity but also ‘island capture’ around Pratas and Paracels. Much of this is intended as a deterrent against American military ambitions and movements though the message is also not lost on Taiwan and the other littorals.

USA. The American approach to the SCS has been marked by a distinct increase in the statements condemning China’s claims and aggressive actions while expressing support for the other claimant countries. This marks a clear change from the erstwhile approach of non-interference in the dispute. American sanctions against entities involved in “malign activities” in the SCS have also increased the pitch, which aim to force China to curb its aggression and be more accommodative of the other littorals. Military activity has been sharply ramped up in the region while force levels have been augmented, especially with the continued presence of aircraft carrier/amphibious strike groups and long range bombers. Increased naval exercises, aircraft flights and joint exercises with Australia and Japan are intended to dissuade any Chinese misadventure while also restricting the freedom of China’s military manoeuvre in wartime. While the USN continues conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) around the disputed features, aircraft flights in the SCS to challenge excessive maritime claims and to collect intelligence have become more frequent. These deployments and exercises are also meant to reassure America’s allies and partners, especially in the ASEAN, of its support during any eventuality.

Malaysia. The submission of a partial claim to the Committee on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) on 12 Dec 19 set off a chain of responses and counter responses. While Chinese intrusions, such as the survey undertaken by the Haiyang Dizhi 8 in April/May 20, elicited conciliatory statements, Malaysia’s subsequent categorical rejection of China’s claims indicates a possible change towards a more robust response. This seems to have been stimulated by American, Vietnamese and Filipino statements on the issue. It is however, unlikely that Malaysia will initiate any kinetic response to Chinese activity/intrusion.

Vietnam. Vietnam’s display of maritime aggression, as seen during the Vanguard Bank standoff (2019), has been conspicuously absent while contending with Chinese activities like the sinking of the fishing trawler in early April 2020 and other maritime incursions. Notwithstanding, its rhetoric against China has gained higher ground, especially in the wake of American actions and statements, as seen in its diplomatic protests as also submissions to the CLCS. Reports about Vietnam intending to resort to legal recourse against China for its claims and activities in the Vietnamese EEZ have continued to appear in media for the past several months. Actions like the recent decree against illegal oil and gas exploration also indicate such an intent. However, it appears that Vietnam is still weighing its options and does not intend to upset its bilateral relations with China, at least for the present.

Philippines. The Philippines government seems to be divided on the approach to deal with China in the SCS. This dichotomy could be attributed to the President’s promises of economic development through Chinese investment, while the others clearly want to deter Chinese inimical activity, aided by American rhetoric and military activity. Continued augmentation of military facilities as also capacities indicate a likely maintenance of an adversarial approach to China, at least, by the security establishment in the near future.

Indonesia. Indonesia, though not a claimant in the SCS dispute, has been faced with Chinese intrusions in its EEZ, especially in the Natunas. It has gradually hardened its approach by bolstering of its military capabilities in the region which manifested in the deterrent deployment of its military against Chinese fishing in Dec 19/Jan 20. Such a response has been episodic, rather than continued, since Chinese investment is an overarching requirement. However, the categorical rejection of China’s 9-dash line is an opportunistic assertion of Indonesia’s rights, especially when China is facing a push back on this issue.

Brunei. While Brunei has desisted from being vocal on issues in the SCS, the flurry of statements by other nations seems to have prompted it to issue a similar one on 20 Jul 20. The statement is quite neutral and only emphasises the importance of bilateral dialogue and UNCLOS/international law in the dispute.

ASEAN. Synergy in the ASEAN’s institutional approach to the SCS has been riven by internal dissensions. However, the statement at the 36^th Summit, especially the emphasis on the alignment of the CoC with international law and UNCLOS seems to indicate Vietnam’s imprint and its current intent for a legal recourse in the ongoing dispute. ASEAN seems to also have accepted the difficulty in reduction of tensions by not referring to the same.

Australia & Japan. Australia’s approach to the SCS has been aligned with that of the US as it has taken a number of complementary actions, both in the political and military domains. Japan has become more assertive in its own territorial dispute with China and this approach has found reflection in its increasingly visible military presence in the SCS. Japan’s sale of naval platforms to the Philippines and Vietnam is intended to bolster their capabilities to restrain Chinese aggression.

Europe. European countries have not been active players in this dispute though the UK and France had deployed military assets to the region, after the PCA award. The announcement of an Indo-Pacific outlook by Germany seems to indicate a possible change though the likelihood of active involvement seems remote.

India. India has maintained a neutral stand on the dispute while emphasising freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of the dispute and the importance of UNCLOS. While this position has served India well, the ongoing developments in the SCS have a direct bearing on India’s aspirations as an important player in the emerging Indo-Pacific.

China’s attempts to generate the perception of a conciliatory approach towards ASEAN are unlikely to translate into a tangible change in its basic outlook. China’s uncompromising stand on territorial integrity, coupled with the SCS as a “core interest”, implies that the region will remain contested well into the foreseeable future. The positions of the ASEAN claimants, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, which are becoming increasingly wary of China, are likely to harden in the near future, supported by the current anti-China trend of US policy. American pressure, both political and military, is unlikely to recede in the mid -term and this can only serve to further accentuate the positions of the ASEAN claimants. China’s extension of an olive branch to these claimants may not withstand the impatience of the Chinese leadership to generate outcomes, in the form of the CoC. The possibility of a local incident or fracas remains high due to the increasing proximity of adversarial military deployments by the US and China.

(The views expressed in the article are of the author and do not reflect official views.)