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By SRF GOPAL SURI
|
15 April, 2021

Wang YI’s Visit to Persian Gulf & Turkey 24 - 29 Mar 21

  1. The Chinese Foreign Minister and State Councilor, Wang Yi, visited Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, UAE, Bahrain with a brief stopover in Oman. Coming on the back of visits by Politburo Member and Director of the Office of the Central committee on Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi to Qatar and Kuwait, in February 2021, it clearly underlines China’s growing focus on the Persian Gulf. Barring Iraq, all countries have hosted high level Chinese dignitaries and their accompanying delegations. A brief analysis of the focus of the discussions is provided below.


Focus of Discussions


  1. The Chinese FM used the occasion to propose a ‘Five Point Initiative on Achieving Security and Stability in the Middle East1. China’s aspirations for regional leadership clearly stand out in its initiative to bring Palestinian and Israeli representatives to China for direct negotiations. It also proposes to formulate a road map for the US and Iran to resume compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The proposal to establish a regional security mechanism, specifically for ensuring safety of oil facilities and shipping lanes, underlines China’s ambitions of becoming a maritime power.


  1. Discussions with Saudi Arabia on the Yemen crisis, with Turkey regarding Afghanistan and highlighting of the Israel-Palestine issue indicate a shedding of China’s earlier reticence in engaging with troublesome issues of the region. Aspirations of regional leadership, possibly brought on by Chinese perceptions of decreasing American engagement with the region, appear to be the driving factor for a renewed focus on the region2.


  1. West Asia and the Persian Gulf have lagged behind in terms of regional Chinese investment under the OBOR. The enmeshing of the national development plans of Saudi Arabia, Iran, UAE and Oman with the OBOR will ensure consolidation of Chinese presence in critical sectors like energy, especially oil and gas development. Continued Chinese investment, which is already substantial, can enable the Chinese to gain controlling stakes in these critical sectors, thereby ensuring security of energy resources for China3.


  1. China has been subjected to vehement criticism from Europe, the US and its allies over violations of human rights in the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. The near-absence of any criticism of China’s policies in Xinjiang from the Muslim countries of the Gulf in the past has aided China in burnishing its credentials with the Muslim world. While Turkey did convey its sensitivities on the subject during Wang’s visit, the support provided by Saudi Arabia and Bahrain further buttresses China’s stand4.


  1. The FTA has been under discussion for nearly a decade without much progress. China appears to be giving it some impetus to boost its international trade, especially in the current post-pandemic scenario5.


  1. The discussion on data security with these countries is another step in furtherance of China’s Global Initiative on Data Security (GIDS). The GIDS is a proposal which China has been propagating since mid-2020 as part of its overall ambition to set the rules in this domain.


  1. Cooperation with these countries as also the provision of vaccines for the pandemic will provide China with considerable influence and help it in the creation of the Health Silk Road under the rubric of the OBOR.


  1. While the current agreement is ostensibly only a broad plan for cooperation, it provides China with an opportunity to consolidate its presence in the region.


Prognosis


  1. The choice of countries for this trip by Wang Yi is interesting, especially Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran. China appears to be confident of balancing the conflicting interests off these countries as it looks at not just gaining a stake in the region, but also a possible leadership role.


  1. This trip also came at a time when the Biden administration was known to be engaging Iran, albeit through third parties, towards rejoining the JCPOA. China may have to do a delicate balancing act vis-à-vis Israel as also Saudi Arabia and Turkey, as it tries to bring back Iran into the international fold, who may not be favourably disposed towards this eventuality.


  1. China’s penchant for proposing mediation in the fractious disputes of the region is likely to continue though these initiatives have not found much traction with the stakeholders. Part of the proposed Five Point Initiative appears to also be aimed at projecting China as a viable security provider though it has yet not interceded in any of the regional disputes in a perceptible manner. However, the proposal of this initiative shows signs of China’s willingness for such intercession, albeit with the tacit concurrence of the regional stakeholders.


  1. Perceptions of American disenchantment with this region seem to be propelling China’s ambitions to claim a stake for regional leadership. Consequently, any change in the American position will force China to re-calibrate its expectations. Nevertheless, leveraging the OBOR and FTA to gain economic clout as also possible interdependence will continue to underpin these Chinese ambitions, considering China’s continued reliance on the region for its energy needs well into the future.


Implications for India


  1. India’s reliance on West Asia, especially the Persian Gulf, for its energy needs and the adversarial aspects of bilateral relations with China necessitate a closer look at Chinese initiatives and ambitions in this region.


  1. Proposals like the establishment of a regional security mechanism warrant closer scrutiny. Continued and vigorous addressing of issues of regional security through existing mechanisms like the IORA and IONS will be critical for avoiding any untoward effects on India’s interests in this vitally important region.

  1. Translation of China’s aspirations of regional leadership into reality in the near future is a distinct possibility considering the growing convergence with states like Saudi Arabia, Iran, UAE and Kuwait. Re-examination of India’s engagement priorities with the region, in consultation with like-minded partners, will help safeguard its interests.


    (The views expressed in the article are of the author and do not reflect official views.)

1https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2878_663746/2880_663750/t1864767.shtml

2https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2878_663746/2880_663750/t1864162.shtml. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2898_663796/2900_663800/t1864537.shtml

3https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2818_663626/2820_663630/t1865100.shtml. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2878_663746/2880_663750/t1865094.shtml. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2863_663716/2865_663720/t1865473.shtml

4https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2803_663606/2805_663610/t1865745.shtml

5https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2878_663746/2880_663750/t1864161.shtml

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