Assessment of Status of China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative in Asia & Indian Ocean Region
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The OBOR initiative has been more than seven years in the making and has a footprint across the globe. The CCCS had earlier carried out an assessment of the progress of OBOR in May 2019, with the current one intended to gain an understanding of the same in the wake of the pandemic. While it may be early to judge the fallout of the pandemic on the OBOR, it will nevertheless provide a sense of the likely direction of this initiative in the near future.
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The assessment has been restricted to the planned corridors/passages of the initiative in Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), namely the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). A tabulated assessment of the status of China’s initiatives in the countries/regions lying along the geographic extent of these corridors/passages, utilising China’s cooperation priorities1, is placed at Appendices A and B. A brief overview of the progress along these ‘economic corridors’ and ‘blue economic passages’ is detailed below.
Silk Road Economic Belt
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China – Mongolia – Russia Economic Corridor. Existent connectivity has provided China the platform to build this corridor with Mongolia and Russia. However, slow progress in road and rail links in Mongolia and the limited number of border check points have been impediments, which have been compounded by the epidemic. Regular trilateral interactions at the highest level between the three countries has been instrumental in demarcating projects in various sectors. A slowdown in Chinese investment has affected the commencement of many of these projects in Mongolia while Russia still remains hesitant in providing seamless road connectivity across its expanse, for Chinese trade to Europe.
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China – Central Asia – West Asia Economic Corridor. China’s ambition of integrating the China – Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has not found much traction, at least with Iran and Afghanistan. On the other hand, the CPEC has achieved much of its originally intended objectives in the power generation and connectivity sectors in Pakistan. In its second phase, the CPEC has prioritised the socio-economic sector, in keeping with the desired aims of the current government in Pakistan. However, slow progress and perceived opposition has led to the Pakistan Army gradually asserting control over execution of projects, possibly with the quiet approval of China. Establishment of a formal mechanism, the China+C5, with the CAR countries, will likely give an added fillip to OBOR projects in this region. However, suspicions of Chinese intentions continue to fuel popular sentiment against China in countries like Kazakhstan. China’s unilateral attitude and the limited road and rail connectivity in the region has impeded seamless transportation of goods, especially in the wake of restrictions imposed during COVID19. Political instability in Afghanistan has led to Chinese reticence in progressing OBOR initiatives in most sectors barring some socio-economic projects and donations/grants. However, digital connectivity along the CPEC and in Afghanistan, has been established through OFC, most likely for military/strategic reasons. China’s investments in the Persian Gulf and West Asia have been largely centred around maritime infrastructure and the energy sector. China has attempted apex-level cooperation through the China Arab States Cooperation Forum but has been able to achieve synergy between OBOR and national development strategies only with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman.
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China – Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor. South East Asia has been a priority region for China in the OBOR. Consequently, most sectors have seen a lot of progress, especially under the aegis of China-ASEAN cooperation. Connectivity has been highlighted under the China-Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 cooperation. Smaller corridors like the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and the China-Laos Economic Corridor (CLEC) have emerged for furtherment of the OBOR in these countries. Hectic visits by the top Chinese foreign policy establishment to SE Asia, in the recent past, for establishing "fast lanes" for regional personnel exchanges and a network of "green lanes" for material circulation indicate the importance accorded to this region. On the other hand, suspicion about Chinese intentions in Myanmar has forced China to scale down a number of ambitious projects. Recent reports of damage to Chinese-invested factories in Myanmar is also representative of public concerns about these issues. Nevertheless, the other countries in the region look at OBOR favourably, especially with regard to Chinese investment.
21st Century Maritime Silk Road
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China – Indian Ocean – Africa – Mediterranean Sea Blue Economic Passage. This is a vital corridor for China since the region is not only a major source of energy and raw material for the Chinese economy, but is also the region through which China’s exports are transported to their final destinations overseas. The maritime dispute in the South China Sea (SCS) continues to remain an impediment to Chinese ambitions, despite Chinese attempts to leverage disagreements in ASEAN to push forward its agenda, especially in the ongoing negotiations for the Code of Conduct (CoC). The critical need for investment in countries like Cambodia, Malaysia and Indonesia as also East Africa has led to China gaining stakes in development of maritime infrastructure like port construction and operation. Established Chinese capabilities in laying of undersea cables have enabled Chinese presence across the IOR. The Chinese footprint is also extensively visible in the EEZ of many countries in South Asia through the deployment of maritime survey ships for joint bilateral scientific missions. Coupled with its activities in regional dialogue mechanisms, especially in the IOR, China’s ambitions to gain a stake in the regional governance architecture become apparent.
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China – Oceania – South Pacific Blue Economic Passage. The island nations of the South Pacific have seen renewed focus from China with MoUs (for OBOR) having been signed with many countries. China not only views these islands as important nodes along its sea lanes but also as military ‘strongpoints’ in its future maritime strategy in the Pacific. Relations with Australia have deteriorated in the past year, due to its increasingly antagonistic stand against China, forcing China to re-calibrate its approach to this region.
Chinese Investment
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A quick look at Chinese investment under the OBOR in the past five years is revealing (refer Appendix C). It indicates a re-balancing of the initial euphoria towards more realistic investment figures. South East Asia has received the largest chunk of Chinese investment, accounting for nearly 30 – 55% annually, over this period, highlighting the importance accorded by China for consolidation of its presence in its immediate neighbourhood. It is also interesting to note that a distinct down trend, in worldwide investment, is clearly visible from 2019, preceding the pandemic. While these figures may not represent the complete panoply of Chinese investments, they are indicative of a re-calibration in China’s approach to OBOR.
Likely Trajectory of OBOR
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Re-calibration. The economic difficulties brought on by the pandemic have further accentuated the re-calibration of the Chinese approach to the OBOR. Moreover, the hesitation towards integration of the OBOR with national development strategies in many countries underlines possible doubts of its viability or even suspicions about Chinese intentions. It is therefore, quite likely that China will take measured steps in furthering the OBOR in most regions, especially with regard to large projects, while accelerating its pace in SE Asia and other more convivial regions like CAR, East Africa and Pakistan. The Persian Gulf and West Asia, barring the energy and infrastructure sector, may therefore not witness any discernible increase in Chinese investment in the immediate future.
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Integration. China’s stated aim of achieving cross-country/regional integration of various connectivities and facilities, through dedicated mechanisms under the banner of the OBOR, to ease out trade has not found too many takers. It has continued utilising existing bilateral and multilateral arrangements for achieving these objectives. It has also initiated arrangements with Singapore in the domain of fintech and is in the process of creating the Colombo International Financial Centre for facilitating financial integration in South and SE Asia. While it has not shown any penchant for paring these ambitions, it is unlikely to aggressively push initiatives for dedicated mechanisms under the umbrella of OBOR in the near future.
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Chinese Digital Footprint. Digital connectivity through OFC and satellite as also undersea cables has allowed China to achieve a dominant position in this sphere. Coupled with the ubiquitous presence of Chinese equipment and the aggressive pursuit of initiatives like the Digital Silk Road (DSR) and the Global Initiative on Data Security (GIDS), creation of a Chinese sphere in this realm is quite likely. Countries in East Africa and South Asia have already subscribed to Chinese telecom projects in 5G and can be persuaded to align themselves with the GIDS and DSR.
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Health Silk Road. China has also been quite effective at generating a perception of being at the forefront of the battle against COVID19 in SE Asia, South Asia and East Africa. It is likely to use this as a springboard for promoting a ‘Health Silk Road’ and integrate existing socio-economic initiatives as also other projects to expand the footprint of the OBOR.
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People-to-People. Increasing exchanges of people and soci-economic initiatives, coupled with proliferation of Confucius Institutes/class rooms, in countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, are indicative of China’s determination of achieving its stated ambition of becoming a “cultural power”.
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Public Reactions to OBOR. Domestic reactions to the OBOR in Asia and the IOR have ranged from huge public resentment to quiet acquiescence. Connectivity projects have largely been accepted though some large projects in sectors like hydroelectric power and industry have elicited public opposition. Myanmar has witnessed criticism on this account and coupled with a suspicion of Chinese intentions has resulted in scaling down of projects. Kazakhstan has also witnessed public demonstrations due to distrust of the Chinese. On the other hand, the China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor has not witnessed much protest, though progress, in terms of large projects has been relatively slow. While South East Asia has been the largest recipient of investment under OBOR as a major focus area of the initiative, it has not witnessed much opposition except on account of some projects in Indonesia. While institutional and public suspicion of Chinese intentions does remain in South East Asia, it is overshadowed by the attraction of Chinese investment. India’s neighbourhood has been fairly receptive to the OBOR though there have been isolated incidents of opposition to Chinese projects in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
Overall Assessment
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China’s initial enthusiasm for the OBOR has been tempered by the reality of the individual aspirations of participant countries over the past six years. It has since made adjustments to its erstwhile unilateral approach and appears to be adopting a more collaborative one over the past couple of years. While China’s ambitions seem to have also been revised, the pandemic has ensured that the scope and size is revised to more realistic proportions, at least in the near term. This has also forced China to prioritise, with SE Asia clearly being a focus area. India’s neighbourhood, barring the CPEC in Pakistan, is likely to witness a more measured approach from China towards the OBOR in the near future.
Appendix A
(Refers to Para 2)
ASSESSMENT OF SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT (SREB)
China – Mongolia – Russia Economic Corridor
|
Ser |
Cooperation Priority of China |
Mongolia |
Russia |
Remarks
|
|
Policy Coordination |
||||
|
|
Building policy exchange and communication mechanism |
Between NDRC2 (China) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mongolia) |
Between NDRC (China) and Federal Ministry of Economic Development (Russia) |
|
|
|
Coordination of economic development strategy |
MoU signed to link OBOR and ‘Prairie Road’ initiative. |
Despite a lot of cooperation, coordination of strategy is not evident. |
|
|
Transport Connectivity |
||||
|
|
Road network development |
Central highway corridor planned but slow progress |
First cross—border highway connection completed in August 2018. |
Trilateral road transportation agreement under ratification. |
|
|
Rail network development |
Central railway corridor with cross-border rail link to China through Erenhot. |
Cross-border rail link to China through Manzhouli. |
|
|
Energy Connectivity |
||||
|
|
Oil and gas pipelines |
Siberia to China gas pipeline (Power of Siberia 2), through Mongolia, under consideration. |
|
|
|
|
Cross border power supply network |
Cross-border transmission lines available though grid interconnection is under construction. |
Cross-border transmission lines available though grid interconnection is under construction. |
|
|
|
Regional power grid |
Concept of North East Asia grid under consideration and hence separate connectivity under OBOR may not be required. |
|
|
|
Information Connectivity |
||||
|
|
Cross border optical cables & other lines |
Available through cable at Erehot. |
Available at five locations along the border. |
|
|
Trade Cooperation |
||||
|
|
Development of hubs |
Current cross-border trade takes place through Erehot while further developments are under progress. |
Current cross-border trade takes place through post at Manzhouli while further developments are under progress. |
|
|
|
Trade agreements |
Feasibility for FTA under discussion. |
China-Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU) signed in May 2018. |
|
|
|
Trade support system |
Electronic data exchange system operational between three countries since early 2018. |
|
|
|
Investment |
||||
|
|
Bilateral investment agreement |
--- |
Under discussion. |
|
|
|
Avoidance of double taxation |
--- |
In force. |
|
|
Financial Integration |
||||
|
|
Bilateral currency swap
|
Extended on 31 Jul 20 till 2023. |
Agreement in June 2019 to replace USD with national currencies for bilateral international settlements. |
|
|
People-to-People |
||||
|
|
Cultural & Academic exchanges |
Friendship Cultural center established in Tuv province in 2018. Nearly 6500 Mongolian students in China. |
Regular institutionalised cultural, academic and other interaction between the two countries. |
Trilateral think tank forum held in Sep 2019. |
|
|
Personnel exchange |
Joint Committee on People-to-People established in 2018. |
|
|
|
|
Media cooperation |
--- |
Regular institutionalised interaction. |
|
|
|
Tourism |
China accounts for the highest number, i.e., 32.7%, of foreign tourists to Mongolia. |
Chinese tourists are the largest number of foreigners to visit Russia while China ranks second among tourist destinations for Russians. |
Trilateral annual tourism ministerial meeting started in 2016. |
China – Central Asia – West Asia Economic Corridor
|
|
Cooperation Priority of China |
CAR |
Afghanistan |
Pakistan |
Gulf Region |
West Asia |
Turkey |
Remarks
|
|
Policy Coordination |
||||||||
|
|
Building policy exchange and communication mechanism |
‘China+C5’ started in July 2020. |
At the level of Foreign Ministers. |
Joint Cooperation Committee for CPEC. |
Under the China Arab States Cooperation Forum. |
Existent bilateral mechanism |
|
|
|
|
Coordination of economic development strategy |
With Kazakhstan. Chinese proposal for alignment of development strategies of all C5 with OBOR. |
Not initiated. |
MoU signed at 1st BRI Forum in May 2017. |
Dovetailed with national development of Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. |
Not initiated. |
Not initiated. |
|
|
Transport Connectivity |
||||||||
|
|
Road network development |
Roads from China to Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. |
Limited connectivity through existing roads. |
Through CPEC. |
--- |
--- |
--- |
|
|
|
Rail network development |
Limited. |
Limited |
Development of Karachi – Peshawar (ML1) under consideration. |
--- |
Proposed Iran - Turkmenistan rail line |
--- |
|
|
Energy Connectivity |
||||||||
|
|
Oil and gas pipelines |
Turkmen-Uzbekistan – Kazakhstan – China . |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
|
|
|
Cross border power supply network |
Limited. Plans for UHV lines under OBOR. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
|
|
|
Regional power grid |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
|
|
Information Connectivity |
||||||||
|
|
Cross border optical cables & other lines |
Being developed as part of Asia-Europe connectivity. |
China - Af OFC3 available. |
China – Pak OFC available. |
While there is no exclusive cable from China to this region, Chinese SOEs4 are part owners in undersea cables connecting this region. |
--- |
|
|
|
Trade Cooperation |
||||||||
|
|
Customs cooperation |
Cooperation agreements signed. |
Not planned. |
Cooperation agreement signed. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
|
|
|
Trade Agreements |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
FTA in effect. |
FTA with GCC5 countries under negotiation since 2005. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
|
|
Investment |
||||||||
|
|
Bilateral investment agreement |
In force. |
Not planned. |
Under CPEC. |
In force. |
In force except with Syria. |
Under discussion. |
|
|
|
Avoidance of double taxation |
In force. |
Not planned. |
In force. |
In force except with Iraq. |
Only with Israel. |
In force. |
|
|
Financial Integration |
||||||||
|
|
Bilateral currency swap |
In force except with Turkmenistan. |
Not planned. |
In force. |
Only with Qatar and UAE. |
Not planned. |
In force. |
|
|
People-to-People |
||||||||
|
|
Cultural, academic and personnel exchanges. |
Ongoing. |
Limited though proposals for increase under discussion. |
Ongoing. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
|
|
|
|
Tourism |
Limited. |
Not planned. |
Under discussion for enhancing flows and easing of procedures. |
Expected to double to 2.9 million by 2022. |
Only to Israel. |
Ongoing with a target of one million Chinese tourist arrivals |
|
China – Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor
|
|
Cooperation Priority |
Laos |
Cambodia |
Vietnam |
Thailand |
Myanmar |
Malaysia |
Remarks
|
|
Policy Coordination |
||||||||
|
|
Building policy exchange and communication mechanism |
At various bilateral governmental levels, in ASEAN as also under the aegis of Lancang – Mekong Cooperation (LMC) and greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) cooperation. |
||||||
|
|
Coordination of economic development strategy |
Not yet. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
With Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC initiative). |
Under China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). |
Not planned. |
Synergy of priorities between ASEAN MPAC 20256 and OBOR. |
|
Transport Connectivity |
||||||||
|
|
Road network development |
Through the R3A highway. |
To Thailand and thence to EEC/R3A. |
Already exists. |
Planned as part of EEC via Laos. |
Planned as part of CMEC. |
Not planned. |
|
|
|
Rail network development |
High Speed Rail (HSR) from Kunming to Vientiane under development
|
Not planned. |
Already exists. |
Planned as extension of China-Laos HSR but no progress. |
Planned as part of CMEC. |
Planned but no progress. |
|
|
Energy Connectivity |
||||||||
|
|
Oil and gas pipelines |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
From Shwe and Kyaukphyu to Kunming. |
Not planned. |
|
|
|
Cross border power supply network |
Limited existing connectivity but not planned under OBOR. |
Not planned. |
Planned under CMEC |
Not planned. |
|
||
|
|
Regional power grid |
Envisaged under China-ASEAN regional grid though no progress observed as yet. |
|
|||||
|
Information Connectivity |
||||||||
|
|
Cross border optical cables & other lines |
Limited. |
--- |
Limited. |
--- |
Likely to be increased under CMEC. |
--- |
Envisaged under China- ASEAN connectivity enhancement. |
|
Trade Cooperation |
||||||||
|
|
Customs cooperation |
Under progress, especially in the aftermath of the US-China trade dispute. |
|
|||||
|
Investment |
||||||||
|
|
Bilateral investment agreement |
In force. |
In force. |
In force. |
In force. |
In force. |
In force. |
|
|
|
Avoidance of double taxation |
In force. |
In force. |
In force. |
In force. |
Possible under CMEC though not planned. |
In force. |
|
|
Financial Integration |
||||||||
|
|
Bilateral currency swap |
Already existent under the Chiang Mai Initiative for ASEAN-China multilateral currency swap. |
|
|||||
|
People-to-People |
||||||||
|
|
Cultural, academic and personnel exchange. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
|
|
|
Tourism |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
|
|
|
Cooperation in S&T |
--- |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
--- |
--- |
--- |
|
|
|
Political exchanges |
Regular. |
Regular. |
Regular. |
--- |
--- |
--- |
|
Appendix B
(Refers to Para 2)
ASSESSMENT OF 21st CENTURY MARITIME SILK ROAD (MSR)
China – Indian Ocean – Africa – Mediterranean Sea
Blue Economic Passage
|
Ser |
Cooperation Priority |
ASEAN |
Myanmar |
B’desh |
Sri Lanka |
Pakistan |
Maldives |
West Asia |
East Africa |
Remarks |
|
Marine Development |
||||||||||
|
|
Cooperation Mechanisms |
Insitutionalised under the DoC7 and 2017-27 Marine Environment Protection plan. Bilateral mechanisms with all countries except Laos.
|
Consensus on development of a cooperation framework |
Regular Dialogue on Maritime Cooperation |
Joint Committee on maritime Cooperation |
Annual Dialogue on Maritime Cooperation |
Planned but not effected. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
|
|
|
Joint monitoring & preservation of coastal ecosystems |
Being undertaken on a bilateral basis in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. Joint declaration of 2017-27 as decade for Protection of Coastal and Marine Environment in SCS. |
Joint maritime surveys. |
Joint maritime surveys. |
Joint survey of EEZ8. time. |
Joint survey of EEZ. |
No progress on MoU signed for establishment of Joint Marine Observation Station in Maldives. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
|
|
|
Demonstration projects |
Various projects with all countries spanning oil & gas to marine science. |
Not planned under CMEC9. |
Not planned. |
Joint Observation network in Sri Lanka’s EEZ and research centre. |
Not planned under CPEC. |
Possible in near future. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
|
|
|
Island & coastal surveys |
Not undertaken. |
Joint seismic surveys. |
Joint seismic surveys. |
Joint EEZ survey |
Joint EEZ and seismic surveys. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
|
|
|
Maritime Industrial parks |
Planned with Malaysia. |
Not planned. |
SEZ10 at Chattogram |
At Hambantota and Colombo. |
Not planned. |
SEZ/FTZs in various countries |
SEZ/FTZ in various countries. |
|
|
|
Maritime Connectivity |
||||||||||
|
|
Improving Shipping Networks |
Agreement on maritime transport between ASEAN and China.
|
Possible in future. |
Not planned. |
Exclusive berthing for Chinese flagged ships at Hambantota and Colombo. |
Exclusive berthing for Chinese flagged ships at Gwadar. |
Not planned. |
Shipping agreement with Saudi Arabia. |
Exclusive berthing for Chinese flagged ships at Chinese controlled ports. |
|
|
|
Construction & Operation of Ports |
In many countries. |
At Kyaukphyu. |
Payra and Mongla. |
Colombo and Hambantota. |
Gwadar. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
In Kenya, Tanzania, Djibouti & Sudan. |
|
|
Information Connectivity |
||||||||||
|
|
Laying of Submarine Cables |
Available |
Available |
Available |
Available |
Available |
Not planned. |
Available. |
Being enhanced. |
|
|
|
Building systems |
Not planned. |
Under CMEC. |
Satellite based. |
Satellite based. |
Under CPEC. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
In some countries. |
|
|
Maritime Security |
||||||||||
|
|
Maritime SAR13 |
Various initiatives under ARF14 work plan. Joint ASEAN-China as also bilateral maritime exercises with PLAN15. |
--- |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Existing mechanism for PN16-PLAN exercises. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
While the PLAN exercises with many navies, SAR has not been insitutionalised.
|
|
|
Maritime Law Enforcement |
Joint patrols with Vietnam. |
Riverine patrols Under the LMC17. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Planned under CPEC. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
PLA(N) anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden since 2008.
|
|
Innovation |
||||||||||
|
|
Education & Cultural Exchange |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Not planned. |
Ongoing. |
|
|
Governance |
||||||||||
|
|
Dialogue Mechanisms |
At various civil and military levels. Mechanism institutionalised with ASEAN and with Pakistan (under CPEC) while regular meetings are conducted with other countries. Mechanisms also being worked out with Myanmar under CMEC. |
Not planned. |
Under FOCAC18.
|
|
|||||
|
|
Cooperation among think tanks |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
Not planned. |
Ongoing. |
|
China – Oceania – South Pacific
Blue Economic Passage
|
Ser |
Cooperation Priority |
Australia |
New Zealand |
Pacific Islands |
Remarks |
|
Marine Development |
|||||
|
|
Cooperation Mechanisms |
Existing bilateral mechanisms. |
Existing bilateral mechanisms. |
China-Pacific Islands Forum. China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum.
|
|
|
|
Joint monitoring & preservation of Coastal ecosystems |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Marine surveys conducted by Chinese vessels. |
|
|
|
Demonstration projects |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
|
|
|
|
Maritime Industrial parks |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Talks in progress. |
|
|
|
Marine Tourism |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Being promoted since 2018. |
|
|
Maritime Connectivity |
|||||
|
|
Construction & Operation of Ports |
Chinese privately operated port at Darwin. |
--- |
Construction of wharf/jetties in Fiji and Vanuatu |
|
|
Information Connectivity |
|||||
|
|
Laying of Submarine Cables
|
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Bid by Huawei for an undersea cable linking some countries. |
|
|
Maritime Security |
|||||
|
|
Joint Ocean observation & Monitoring network |
Not planned. |
Not planned. |
Possible in near future. |
|
|
Innovation |
|||||
|
|
Education & Cultural Exchange |
Limited |
Limited |
Ongoing. |
|
|
Governance |
|||||
|
|
Dialogue Mechanisms |
Existing mechanisms. |
Not planned. |
Under the aegis of China-Pacific Islands cooperation and other UN bodies. |
|
|
|
Cooperation among think tanks |
Ongoing. |
Ongoing. |
--- |
|
CHINESE INVESTMENT IN OBOR19
(In Million USD)
This assessment is not quantitative but subjective, based on the monitoring of Chinese initiatives and objectives for the various cooperation priorities set out in the ‘Action Plan’ for the OBOR and 21st Century MSR.
National Development and Reforms Commission (NDRC).
3OFC – Optical Fibre Cable.
4SOE – State Owned Enterprise.
5GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council.
6MPAC 2025 – Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025.
7Declaration of Conduct of Parties (DoC) in the South China Sea (SCS) agreed in 2002.
8EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone.
9CMEC – China Myanmar Economic Corridor.
10SEZ – Special Economic Zone.
11FTZ – Free Trade Zone.
12China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
13SAR – Search and Rescue.
14ARF – ASEAN Regional Forum (Work Plan 2019-21).
15PLAN – People’s Liberation Army Navy.
16PN – Pakistan Navy.
17LMC – Lancang Mekong Cooperation.
18FOCAC – Forum for China Africa Cooperation.
Compiled using data from the China Global Investment Tracker of the American Enterprise Institute.