Sinicisation of Religion Under Xi Jinping (XJP)

1. Introduction.  China has been trying to harness religion to promote socialism with Chinese characteristics. This involved a push for certain changes in religious customs and practices and severe the umbilical cord with religious bodies outside China.   While this process was implemented in a subtle and gentle manner in the first two decades of reform, a sense of urgency developed once the colour revolution began which the Chinese perceived as efforts to topple regimes. While form of tackling the external allegiances of established religions such as Islam, Christianity and Tibetan Buddhism was to suppress their practitioners, a vigorous effort has been made to infuse Chinese concepts, language, patriotism and loyalty to the CPC through religious associations established under the patronage of the CPC to sinicise religions in China. This process has been implemented with greater vigour under XJP.

2. History of Sinicisation. The term “Sinicisation” was coined by Chao Wang and Shining Gao in late 2012. The state has calibrated its level of control over religion depending upon the circumstances. During Cultural Revolution (1966-76), religion was especially suppressed, houses of worship were destroyed and clergymen were forced to work in the fields. Mao's successors have constantly tried to find the ‘‘correct’’ way to control, co-opt and absorb religion into the Communist state. Deng Xiaoping’s (1979-1997) period saw a strong growth of religious activities and was perceived to play a positive role in supporting the modernisation goals of China. Under Jiang Zemin, tightening of religious policy began. Under Hu Jintao land redevelopment was used as a form of religious persecution to demolish spiritually sacred buildings and sites.

3. The Communist Party of China (CPC), officially recognises five religions namely Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism. The followers of five religions operate under the “Patriotic” Associations. State controls the personnel, publications and finances of the religious associations. The party discourages CPC members from publicly participating in the religious ceremonies. "Sinicisation of Religion" was mentioned by XJP at the United Front Work Conference on Religious Work in 2015, and has since been implemented throughout China. China has about 5,500 religious groups and eight national religious organisations. The White Paper published in 2018 states that there are 200 million religious believers, but foreign experts estimate it to be more than double that figure. At present, 20,000 prominent figures from the religious circles serve as deputies and members at all levels of people’s congresses and committees of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, CPPCC (non-party members).

4. Objectives of Sinicisation.  The main objective of Party’s Religious policy is to have control over all non-party spheres and institutions and remove contradictions that might challenge party ideology and rule. The policy is also discriminatory as it favours the indigenous religions such as Chinese Buddhism and Taoism. The CPC religious control has intensified since XJP took office in 2012.

5. Agencies Engaged in Sinicisation Campaign. The Party manages religion through institutions such as the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission (ERAC), the Ministry of Public Security, the United Front Work Department (UFWD), the Propaganda Department and the patriotic associations.

6. XJP's Policy on Religion.

(a) Tibetan Buddhism. The main aim of the so-called "Patriotic re-education" campaign was to transform Tibetan national identity into Chinese identity and eradicate loyalty to the Dalai Lama. The Chinese Panchen Lama, Gyaltsen Norbu pointed out at the “Two Sessions” in March 2021 that Tibetan Buddhism will adapt to the conditions of a socialist society with Chinese characteristics and move towards sinicisation. The UFWD is holding exams on topics such as Chinese law, Marxism, the revised PRC constitution and "Xi Jinping Thought" to test the loyalty of Tibetan Buddhists. Buddhist texts and religious books are replaced with books on Xi Jinping Thought and traditional Chinese culture. It has been easier for the Chinese government to control and silence the Buddhist Practitioners of Han ethnicity because they remain in direct contact and monitoring of CPC. To strengthen its control on Buddhist religious education centres, Chinese government has placed monasteries under the direct rule of government officials (Larung Gar and Yarchen Gar Buddhist Institutes).

(b) Islam.  The domes and minarets built in “Arab” or “Saudi” style are being replaced with Chinese-style roofs to promote a “Sinicised” version of Islam. Hijabs are prohibited in schools, universities, hospitals and government buildings.  Arabic script is prohibited in kindergartens. Uighur Muslim Children are encouraged to take part in anti-religious activities in the belief that if succeeding generations are taught to reject religion, it would eventually die out. To step up sinicisation efforts, China has translated and published Quran in Chinese language. The Chinese government is “reinterpreting” the Quran so that it has “socialist characteristics”.

(c) Christianity.  The Catholic and Protestant communities in China with their ties to the West are seen as susceptible to Western conspiracies to contain or weaken China. The Party has initiated policy measures to infuse patriotic messages in sermons and raise the Chinese national flag inside churches to boost patriotism and nationalism. In 2020, Pastors in China integrated Xi’s ideas on curbing food waste into their sermons. The number of Christians have surpassed the number of Party members. The Catholicism encounters more difficulties with the Chinese authorities than Protestantism because of the long-strained Sino-Vatican relations. China has printed more than 80 million Bibles in Chinese language.

7.  Conclusion.  While CPC has been undertaking continuous, serious campaigns to bring religious practices and institutions to conform to its interests and eliminate any extra territorial or independent alliances, it has not been entirely successful. Reports of hundreds of underground churches outside state control are reported, as also devotion to the Dalai Lama by the Tibetans. Muslims, particularly Uighurs continue to have contacts with and look towards their co-religious units in Central Asia. Hence, while continuing with sinicisation, repression would remain an important tool for CPC to manage religion.

 (The views expressed in the article are of the author and do not reflect official views.)